

Hi^3 : AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF THE SCALABILITY

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InfraHIP Project
(Infrastructure for Host Identity Protocol)
by Helsinki Institute for Information Technology

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0. What is Hi^3

Host Identity Protocol (HIP), Internet Indirection Infrastructure (i^3), and Hi^3 architecture.

1. Hi^3 analysis

Aim, subject and assumptions.

2. Basic Hi^3 scenarios


HIP messages and their traveling through the infrastructure.
 Hi^3 parameters and latency of HIP messages.

3. Scalability analysis


Hi^3 deployment, workload, Hi^3 size, resilience to attacks.

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Hi^3 architecture



- Host identity layer between transport and network layers
- IP address is a topological label
- i^3 trigger (id, R)
- Separating control and data
- Protecting data traffic




HIP messages (control plane):

- base exchange
- mobility exchange
- ...

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Hi^3 Analysis: 1. Aim and Subject




- HIP messages:
 - base exchange
 - mobility exchange
- i^3 messages:
 - trigger insertion
 - trigger refreshment
 - HIP processing delegation
- Attacks to Hi^3 :
 - burst of HIP messages
 - burst of i^3 messages

Scalability properties ?

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Hi³ Analysis: 2. Assumptions




- A few parameters
 - manageable
 - outside i^3
 - required characteristics
- Uniformity of parties involved:
 - i^3 servers
 - mobile hosts
 - Internet servers
- Inexhaustible communication:
 - worst case
 - averaging

Basic trends for scalability ?


Average estimates for a “globally worst case”

Hi³ scenarios: 1. Pure association setup (1/3)



I1 and R1 packets

HIP base exchange in Hi³



I2 and R2 packets

Hi³ scenarios: Parameters

i^3 infrastructure of size N

Number of i^3 servers: N

Transit time: in average, ms

A. host $\leftrightarrow i^3$: $\tau' = \tau_C^{Hi3}$, $\tau'' = \tau_S^{Hi3}$

B. i^3 server $\leftrightarrow i^3$ server


1. direct IP: τ
2. i^3 lookup: $\tau O(\log N)$

C. host \leftrightarrow host: $\tau_{SC} = \tau_{CS}$


Processing time: in average, ms

1. one packet forward: μ
2. HIP cryptography: μ_{pr}

i^3 lookup: $(\tau + \mu)O(\log N) \sim \frac{\tau + \mu}{2} \log N$




Hi³ scenarios: 1. Pure association setup (2/3)



I1 and R1 packets


Latency L^{Hi3} ?

- Time inside i^3 and outside
- Four packets in HIP base exchange
- $L_s^{Hi3} = 4(\tau^{Hi3} + \tau^{out})$



I2 and R2 packets

Hi^3 scenarios: 1. Pure association setup (3/3)




I1 and R1 packets

$$L_s^{Hi3} = 4\tau_C^{Hi3} + 3(\tau + \mu) \log N + 4\tau_S^{Hi3} + 2\mu_{pr} \quad (1)$$

and

$$4\tau^{Hi3} = 3(\tau + \mu) \log N \quad (1a)$$


$$4\tau^{out} = 4\tau_C^{Hi3} + 2\mu_{pr} + 4\tau_S^{Hi3}$$



I2 and R2 packets

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Hi^3 scenarios: 2. Optimized association setup



Hi^3 scenarios: Summary

Scenario	#pkts	Inside Hi^3	Outside Hi^3	Occurrence
Pure setup	4	$3(\tau + \mu) \log N$	$4\tau_C^{Hi^3} + 2\mu_{pr} + 4\tau_S^{Hi^3}$	medium
Opt. setup	4	$(\tau + \mu) \log N$	$3\tau_C^{Hi^3} + 2\mu_{pr} + \tau_S^{Hi^3} + \tau_{SC}$	medium
Loc. update	$2 + k$			frequent
phase 1	2	μ	$RTT(C, Hi3)$	
phase 2	k	0	$\frac{k}{2}RTT(C, S)$	
Sim. update	6			rare
phase 1	$2 + 2$	2μ	$RTT(C1, Hi3) + RTT(C2, Hi3)$	
timeout	—	—	—	
phase 2	2	$\frac{\tau + \mu}{2} \log N$	$\tau_{C1}^{Hi^3} + \tau_{C2}^{Hi^3} + \tau_{C2,C1}$	

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
Scalability: 1. Mobile peers 2/4

Scenario	Hi^3 workload, W	Inside i^3 , T^{Hi^3}
Pure setup	$\frac{3\lambda_s M \log N}{N}$	$3(\tau + \mu) \log N$
Opt. setup	$\frac{\lambda_{so} M \log N}{N}$	$(\tau + \mu) \log N$
Update	$\frac{\lambda_u M}{N} \left(1 + \frac{1}{2} P_{su} \log N\right)$	$\mu + P_{su} \frac{\tau + \mu}{2} \log N$ $\approx P_{su} \frac{\tau + \mu}{2} \log N$ or $\approx (\tau + \mu) \left(1 + \frac{P_{su}}{2} \log N\right)$

$$N \approx \frac{\lambda M \cdot T^{Hi^3}}{(\tau + \mu)W} = \frac{\lambda M \cdot T^{Hi^3}(N)}{(\tau + \mu)W(N)} \quad (5)$$

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Scalability: 1. Mobile peers 1/4



- M is #(mobile hosts)
- N is #(i³ servers)
- λ is intensity of a mobile host to send a HIP message ($\lambda_s, \lambda_{so}, \lambda_u$)
- P_{su} is probability that a location update becomes a simultaneous update.
- Workload W is #requests (average) to an i^3 server:

$$W = \frac{\lambda M}{N} \cdot \#(i^3 \text{ servers for a HIP message})$$

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Scalability: 1. Mobile peers 3/4

- HIP messages are mixed:

$$W_{tot} = W_s + W_{so} + W_u, \quad T_{avg}^{Hi^3} = \frac{\lambda_s T_s^{Hi^3} + \lambda_{so} T_{so}^{Hi^3} + \lambda_u T_u^{Hi^3}}{\lambda_s + \lambda_{so} + \lambda_u}$$

- More precise:

$$W_{tot} = \frac{\lambda_{tot} M \log N}{N} + \frac{\lambda_u M}{N}, \quad T_{avg}^{Hi^3} = \frac{\lambda_{tot}}{\lambda_s + \lambda_{so} + \lambda_u} (\tau + \mu) \log N,$$

where $\lambda_{tot} = 3\lambda_s + \lambda_{so} + \frac{P_{su}}{2} \lambda_u$


- Scalability estimation:

$$N = \frac{\lambda M \cdot T_{avg}^{Hi^3}}{(\tau + \mu)W_{tot}} \quad (6)$$

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
Scalability: 1. Mobile peers 4/4

$$\lambda_s = \lambda_{so} = 30\text{min}^{-1}, \lambda_u = 1\text{min}^{-1}, P_{su} = 10^{-2}, \mu = 1\text{ms}$$



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Scalability: 2. Stationary and mobile hosts



- M is #(mobile hosts)
- N is #(i³ servers)
- L is #(stationary Internet servers)
- λ is intensity of a mobile host to send a HIP message ($\lambda_s, \lambda_{so}, \lambda_u, P_{su}$)
- λ_r is intensity of a server to refresh its public trigger in i³.

$$W_{\text{tot}} = \frac{\lambda_{\text{tot}} M \log N}{N} + \frac{\lambda_u M + 2\lambda_r L}{N}$$

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Scalability: Summary

Increasing N leads to:


- Workload decreases as $W = C_1(\lambda, \#) \cdot \frac{\log N}{N} + C_2(\lambda, \#) \cdot \frac{1}{N}$
- Inside latency increases as $T^{\text{Hi3}} = C_3(\lambda, \tau + \mu) \cdot \log N$

Infrastructure size N is proportional:

$$N \approx C_4(\lambda, \#, \frac{1}{\tau + \mu}) \cdot \frac{T^{\text{Hi3}}}{W}$$

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Application scenarios: 3. Zombie attacks 1/3



Workload:

average #requests to an i³ server

Attack types:


- Trigger insertion: $W_{zi} = \frac{\lambda_{zi} Z \log N}{N}$
- Initiation of association setup
 1. send I1
 2. receive R1
 3. immediately reply with I2 and wrong puzzle solution

$$\text{Pure base exchange: } W_{zs} = \frac{5\lambda_{zs} Z \log N}{2N}$$

$$\text{Optimized base exchange: } W_{zso} = \frac{\lambda_{zs} Z \log N}{N}$$

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Application scenarios: 3. Zombie attacks 2/3



- $W_{\text{good}} = W_{s*} + W_u + W_r$
 $W_{\text{bad}} = W_{z*} = \frac{\lambda_z Z \log N}{N}$
- $W_{\text{tot}} = W_{\text{good}} + W_{\text{bad}}$
- Criteria: $W_{\text{tot}} \mu \leq W_{\text{threshold}} \mu$
 e.g. $W_{\text{threshold}} \mu = 50\%, 70\%, 90\%$
- Threshold: $z = \lambda_z Z = ?$

$$z = (W_{\text{threshold}} - W_{\text{good}}) \frac{N}{\log N}$$




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Conclusion

1. Simple assumptions leads to *basic trends only*
2. Hi^3 has *acceptable inside latency* and *satisfactory scalability property*
3. Infrastructure of *a few nodes* ($\sim 10^2$) is sufficient for *a large set* of HIP hosts ($\sim 10^6..10^7$)

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Application scenarios: 3. Zombie attacks 3/3



A HIP packet is several hundred bytes, or ≈ 0.5 Kbytes = 4 Kbits.

max $\lambda_z \approx 0.25$ for 1Mbs throughput

Z	$z = \lambda_z \cdot Z$	N
10	2.5	< 50
50	12.5	< 100
100	25.0	< 200

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